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Board Composition and Corporate Diversification in UK Listed Companies: A Panel 
Data Analysis 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the link between the board composition and the corporate 
diversification decisions of 50 large UK listed corporations over the period from 2005 to 2015. 
The panel data analysis integrates changes in board composition and its dynamic effect on the 
extent of diversification. We find that increased board independence influences the extent of 
both unrelated and related diversification. Neither institutional representatives nor extra-
industry interlocking directors influence the extent of diversification in ways which promote 
shareholders’ interests. The findings supports corporate governance policy promoting board 
independence. In contrast, these findings suggest extending the involvement of institutional 
investors to board representation may not mitigate agency problems in large companies.   
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1 Introduction 
This paper adds to the literature surrounding the governance role of corporate boards of 
directors by exploring the link between board composition and corporate diversification. In 
large joint stock companies, characterised by the separation of ownership and control, 
corporate governance mechanisms are intended to provide shareholders with some reassurance 
that managers will try to achieve outcomes that are in their interests (Shliefer and Vishny, 
1997). With ongoing concerns about the effectiveness of such mechanisms, considerable 
academic research and policy discussions on corporate governance reform has centred on the 
role of corporate boards of directors (Adams et al. 2010). The work has produced a range of 
perspectives on the contribution of boards to corporate decision-making. Managerial 
hegemony theory suggests that boards are ineffective governance mechanisms, making little 
contribution to corporate decision-making (Pfeffer, 1972). Meanwhile, agency theory proposes 
that the corporate governance role of boards involves monitoring and discipline (Kaplan and 
Minton, 2006). Finally, stewardship theory argues that boards take an ‘active’ role in the 
management and control of corporations (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Walsh and Seward, 
1990). These different perspectives have significant implications for the role of boards as 
effective corporate governance mechanisms and have influenced the policy debate as a result.    
Corporate governance reform has emphasised the extent to which boards are independent of 
senior managers on the basis that such outside directors, acting as autonomous guardians of 
shareholder wealth, should ensure that resources are utilised effectively. For example, the most 
recent revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016, p. 
10) states, “…the board should determine whether the director is independent in character and 
judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or 
could appear to affect, the director’s judgement”. To enhance the independence of boards, the 
UK Code expects a majority of board members in large companies to meet its definition. The 
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is echoed in the US, where the listing requirements of both the New York Stock Exchange and 
the NASDAQ include requirements for a majority of independent directors on the board.   
Unfortunately, the extensive work analysing the impact of board independence on performance 
has produced little positive evidence (McKnight and Weir, 2009; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007), 
and while other research indicates that such independent directors monitor and discipline senior 
managers (Chizema and Kim, 2010), there is scant evidence for their active involvement in 
formulating strategy, except in periods of crises (O’ Shannassy, 2010). 
The literature highlights the extent of information asymmetry between independent directors 
and executive directors as the key factor determining the effectiveness of boards (Holmstrom, 
2005). Access to information by independent directors is hampered by the limited time they 
can devote to a company (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999) and the 
reluctance of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to reveal it (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Agency problems between shareholders and managers could 
be resolved by the presence of representatives of institutional ownership blocks on boards since 
they have an incentive to overcome information asymmetries and challenge management 
recommendations (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Some evidence suggests that such behaviour by 
institutional investors is associated with improved performance (Clifford, 2008).  
One area which could deepen knowledge of the influence of board composition on corporate 
governance is an analysis of its link with corporate diversification decisions. Corporate 
diversification is defined by Montgomery (1994) as participation in different markets. In the 
literature, a distinction is drawn between related and unrelated product diversification. Related 
diversification involves products where synergies arising from economies of scope exist. 
According to the resources approach, the ability of companies to exploit underutilised 
competences across related product markets enhances firm value (Rumelt, 1982). Meanwhile, 
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unrelated diversification involves companies operating in very different product areas. 
Efficiency theory proposes that while investors should diversify their own portfolios across 
unrelated activities, in line with portfolio theory, it is wasteful if companies do it on their behalf. 
Consequently, unrelated diversification by companies is detrimental to shareholders’ wealth 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981; Graham et al., 2002). Therefore, if boards were effective corporate 
governance mechanisms, then firms should pursue related product diversification and avoid 
unrelated product diversification.  
This paper adds to the corporate governance literature on the role of boards by analysing the 
link between board composition and UK corporate diversification. The contributions include 
incorporating recent developments in board dynamics in the context of asymmetric information 
to develop hypotheses analysing whether the presence of directors with specific attributes can 
indicate their role in decision-making. Further, the paper incorporates a longitudinal aspect to 
the analysis which integrates changes in board composition and its dynamic effect on the extent 
of diversification. We also distinguish between the degree of related and unrelated 
diversification that firms conduct. Our findings imply that boards are active monitors, with the 
proportion of independent directors and their average length of tenure having a significant 
impact on both unrelated and related product diversification in the direction anticipated by 
agency theory. This suggests that, not only the presence of independent directors, but also, their 
cumulative experience of the company helps overcomes the asymmetric information they face. 
Since tenures can be short, we proposes that, in addition to increasing the proportion of 
independent directors on boards, encouraging longer tenures should produce more effective 
corporate governance.  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section discusses existing theories which have 
conflicting views of the role of boards in corporate decision-making, incorporating recent 
developments regarding the role of boards in corporate strategy in the context of asymmetric 
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information. We derive hypotheses proposing links between aspects of board composition and 
the extent of corporate diversification. Section 3 presents the sample, variables and empirical 
design. Section 4 presents the findings and discusses their implications. Section 6 is the 
conclusion.  
 
2 The Corporate Governance Role of Boards in Decision-making 
Corporate strategy defines an iterative process through which a corporation attempts to use the 
resources it controls to maximise value (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). Strategy will include 
identifying areas where resources would be used most efficiently. This will necessarily involve 
decisions surrounding the extent of diversification pursued by a firm. Where capital markets 
are highly liquid, shareholders have an ability to select and maintain a level of risk by holding 
a diversified portfolio of shares. As a result, they prefer companies to focus on related 
investments around the exploitation of core competences – termed related diversification 
(Rumelt, 1982). The corporate governance concern is that executive directors, in order to 
spread their firm-specific risk or ‘empire-build’ (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986; Lane 
et al, 1998), may pursue unrelated diversification where there is little scope for the exploitation 
of core competences. The implication for the role of boards as effective corporate governance 
mechanisms is to ensure diversification decisions maximise value, increasing the extent of 
related diversification and avoiding unrelated diversification.  
Since boards are endogenous (all companies have them), empirical work focuses on structural 
differences across boards which are anticipated to capture differences in behaviour, and hence 
their role, if any, in corporate governance. CEO-Chairman duality, board size, staggered 
boards, board appointments, board diversity and composition are some of the structural features 
which have been analysed in the literature (see Adams et al., 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
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Goyal and Park, 2002; Guo et al., 2008; Tian and Twite, 2011; Yermack, 1996). In particular, 
since they are viewed as independent guardians of shareholder wealth, the role of outside 
directors has received much attention. The different theories of corporate governance have 
conflicting views regarding the role of independent directors in ensuring that companies use 
resources in ways which maximise value (Adams et al., 2010). This influences their views on 
whether more independent boards lead to more effective corporate governance. While the 
evidence surrounding the influence of such directors on firm performance is mixed (Bhagat 
and Black, 2002; Dalton et al., 1998; Gillette, et al., 2008; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 
2008), there has been limited research of the influence of board independence on corporate 
strategy.  
Research suggests that information asymmetry is the crucial factor concerning the effectiveness 
of boards (Holmstrom, 2005). Independent directors have less information than executive 
directors and the CEO. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find evidence for such information 
asymmetry. Analysing the relative profitability of trades in firms’ shares by inside / outside 
directors, they found that insiders earn higher returns, indicating they have privileged access to 
information.  
Managerial hegemony theory argues that this asymmetry of information between the executive 
and independent directors prevents the latter from exercising a credible challenge to decisions. 
Consequently, corporate strategic decisions are taken by senior management without reference 
to the board. Boards are a legal fiction with no practical governance function. Boards exist to 
satisfy the requirements of corporate law, serve as an ally of management and provide 
legitimacy to the strategic decisions made by management (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Pfeffer, 
1972; Stiles, 2001; Stiles and Taylor, 1996). Much of the evidence in support of this perspective 
is dated (Mace, 1971), and, as time has gone on, descriptive studies have suggested greater 
board involvement in strategy (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
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Zahra and Pearce, 1989). However, the limited number of econometric studies have been more 
equivocal (cf Datta et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009).  
Alternative theories do suggest a role for boards in decision-making. Agency theory proposes 
that self-interested managers pursue activities which conflict with the interests of shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The separation of ownership and control in joint stock companies 
with dispersed ownership requires independent directors on boards who, while not directly 
participating in strategic decision-making, have a corporate governance role to oversee, 
monitor and discipline top management on behalf of shareholders, using the limited 
information available to them (Dominguiz-Martinez et al., 2008; Hillman and Delziel, 2003).  
In this context, Adams and Ferrera (2007) develop a model where CEOs can influence the 
decisions of boards by controlling information released to independent directors about the 
viability of investment decisions, including diversification. Board independence is an 
important aspect of the model, influencing the CEOs incentive to share information about the 
payoffs from diversification. They demonstrate that if boards could take control over decision-
making in all circumstances it is in CEOs interest to share the information. The important 
features of the model are the ability of a board to exert control and the personal cost this 
imposes on a CEO – they do not like losing control. Exerting control has a cost for boards, but 
this cost falls with greater board independence. More independent boards find it easier to 
confront CEOs and extract information. Consequently, more independent boards will protect 
shareholders’ interests, constraining managers’ pursuit of unrelated diversification and 
encouraging related diversification.  
Stewardship theory provides a different view of the incentives of executive directors compared 
to agency theory (Davis et al., 1997). This perspective states that, as stewards of a corporation’s 
resources, boards will take an active role in strategic decision-making (Forbes and Milliken, 
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1999; Hung, 1998; Stiles, 2001). Managers are not motivated by extrinsic rewards, but “…a 
need to achieve, to gain an intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing inherently 
challenging work. To exercise responsibility and authority…” (Donaldson, 1990, p. 375). 
Consequently, rather than shareholders’ and mangers’ goals diverging, they are congruent. 
Stewardship theory implies that it is executive directors, not independent directors who will 
have most to contribute to strategy, since they will have the knowledge, expertise and 
commitment which independent directors, constrained by time and resources, lack. Decision-
making dominated by such directors will be in shareholders’ interests and produce better 
performance (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory argues 
that governance structures like the board of directors should be designed to empower rather 
than constrain managers. Stewardship theory favours smaller, less independent boards, giving 
executive directors more autonomy. Faced with more independent directors, executives are 
likely to have a reduced incentive to pay proper attention to decision-making. Indeed, the 
ambiguous relationship between board independence and firm performance that is observed in 
some research provides support for this view (Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). The 
limited cross-sectional analysis conducted has found no evidence for this perspective (Chen et 
al., 2009).  
The different theoretical perspectives – managerial hegemony, agency and stewardship – 
predict a different relationship between board independence and the extent of unrelated 
corporate diversification. Since, the regulatory tide in the UK has flowed towards agency 
theory conceptions of the role of independent directors, this research will test hypotheses based 
on its propositions: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative association between board independence and the 
corporation’s extent of unrelated diversification.   
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Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive association between board independence and the 
corporation’s extent of related diversification. 
In contrast to the theories above, which focus on board independence, resource dependency 
theory focuses on interlocking directorships which link companies to competitors and other 
stakeholders (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Such interlocks occur 
when a person affiliated with one corporation serves on the board of another corporation 
(Mizruchi, 1996). Interlocks may act as information pathways between corporations and 
provide useful information on a corporation’s external business environments (Haunschild and 
Beckman, 1998). Consequently, the intra-industry and extra-industry ties of interlocking 
directors are expected to have different effects on corporations’ types of diversification. 
Interlocking directors with intra-industry ties are likely to promote investments in areas they 
know about – related products and markets. On the other hand, interlocking directors with 
extra-industry ties could connect a corporation with broader investment opportunities, 
increasing the possibility of a board choosing to diversify across unrelated sectors (Daily and 
Dalton, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This is echoed in recent work by Kaczmarek et al., 
(2014), who report that executives’ extra-industry ties are associated with innovative strategies 
while executives’ intra-industry ties are related to strategic conformity. Consequently, resource 
dependency theory suggests a positive association between the proportion of directors with 
extra-industry links and a corporation’s level of unrelated diversification. Indeed, Chen et al. 
(2009) find a significantly positive association concluding that directors with extra-industry 
ties do act as information pathways promoting a corporate strategy involving significant 
unrelated diversification. While their research includes any ties, it can be argued that if the 
board members are independent directors in extra-industry corporations, they may face the 
same information asymmetries there. Therefore, it would be best to focus on those board 
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members who have extra-industry executive directorships. Consequently, we propose to test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the proportion of interlocking 
board members with extra industry executive directorships and the extent of unrelated 
diversification. 
Some proponents of agency theory predict that another type of director may also help overcome 
the asymmetric information in corporate decision-making and curb managerial opportunism 
(Stearns and Mizruchi, 1993). In the UK, financial institutions are important investors, holding 
a large proportion of the shares issues by corporations (Kay report, 2012). Kay related that an 
overwhelming proportion of shares in FTSE100 companies were held by financial institutions. 
Consequently, their trading decisions can have a big impact on corporations. Indeed, agency 
theory predicts that such institutions should have an incentive to monitor managers properly if 
their substantial block-holdings make the cost-benefit trade-off worthwhile. However, while 
such institutional investors control large amounts of equity, their holdings are well-diversified, 
meaning insignificant holdings in any one company. Therefore, such institutions have been 
assumed to be ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’ investors. Indeed, they may not see themselves as 
owners of corporate resources at all; equity is just another asset to be traded (Padgett, 2012).  
However, there has been a long-standing view that institutional investors could be made more 
effective in governing corporations, with evidence indicating that active engagement does have 
a positive impact. For instance, both Brav, et al., (2008) and Clifford (2008) found that when 
hedge funds managers choose to follow an interventionist strategy in companies the financial 
performance of the latter was improved. Investigating the Chinese environment, Yuan et al. 
(2009) found that financial institutions played an active role, offsetting the issues relating to an 
immature regulatory environment as well as inadequate transparency and disclosure rules. 
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They argued that such activism was absent in developed markets because of issues surrounding 
conflicts of interest and monitoring costs. However, financial institutions have informational 
and analytical advantages in monitoring management (Webb et al., 2003), and in the UK and 
other market-based governance jurisdictions, it has been recommended that institutional 
investors become more active stewards of companies rather than passive traders (Kay, 2012).  
In the UK, such intervention tends to involve informal liaison with boards of the companies 
concerned. It does not involve formal representation on boards (Aguilera et al., 2006). 
However, it can be argued that, if a financial institution has an ownership block, their board 
representatives have an incentive to incur the monitoring costs needed to overcome information 
asymmetries associated with corporate boards and challenge management recommendations 
decisions (Duchin et al, 2010). Even if they do not represent any institutional ownership block, 
independent directors who are directors of financial institutional investors may have an 
insiders’ knowledge and expertise, reducing monitoring costs and ensuring corporate decisions 
reflect shareholders’ interests (Harris and Raviv, 2008).  
Although there has been research into the impact of institutional ownership representation on 
corporate performance, there has been insufficient analysis of their impact on strategic 
decision-making. If they are an effective presence on boards, overcoming asymmetric 
information to resolve agency conflicts, then such institutional representatives should restrict 
the extent of value-destroying unrelated diversification and promote value-enhancing related 
product diversification. Chen et al. (2009) found that institutional representatives had no 
influence on the extent of unrelated corporate diversification, but that paper did not specify the 
nature of the institutional representation. We test the agency theory hypothesis regarding the 
influence of institutional representatives on boards: 
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Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative association between the proportion of institutional 
ownership representatives on the corporation’s board and its level of unrelated 
diversification. 
Further, such institutional representation should support value-enhancing related 
diversification. Hence, the following hypothesis can be proposed: 
Hypothesis 3b:  There is a positive association between the proportion of institutional 
ownership representatives on the corporation’s board and its level of related 
diversification. 
 
3 Research Method 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We extend research into the impact of board characteristics on corporate diversification by 
testing the hypotheses stated in the previous section. Since the extent of corporate 
diversification will be the product of many decisions taken over a period of time and will take 
time to change in response to changes in the composition of a corporation’s board, panel data 
analysis is appropriate. This approach captures not just differences across corporations, but 
also a dynamic element, relating changes in board composition to changes in the extent of 
product diversification. This will enable conclusions with reference to the hypotheses to be 
drawn. 
We use a sample of 50 large UK Listed corporations with annual data for 11 years between 
2005 and 2015. The sample is selected from the largest 250 companies by turnover for 2015. 
Previous work tends to select on the basis of market capitalisation, but we adopt turnover, since 
this is a better reference to the size of a corporation in the context of diversification (Rumelt, 
1982). Larger corporations were chosen because their management are more likely to face 
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critical strategic decisions surrounding diversification, either related or unrelated. Further, they 
will tend to have the dispersed ownership structure that requires the delegation of decision-
making to boards of directors. Consequently, these firms are appropriate to determine whether 
board characteristics influence product diversification. We excluded financial corporations 
because of the different structures of their balance sheets and their specialised measurement of 
diversification (Chen et al., 2009). The balanced panel dataset comprised 550 observations 
from a total of 50 companies. 
3.2 Data Collection and Variable Definitions 
The dependent variable is the level of corporate diversification. This paper focuses on product 
diversification. Product diversification measures the distribution of assets, sales and other 
indices across different industries (Beard and Dees, 1981). We add to existing work by 
distinguishing between unrelated and related product diversification. We use the distribution 
of sales revenue across different GISC industries to determine the extent of unrelated 
diversification using the Jacquemin and Berry (1979) entropy measure. We use the distribution 
of sales revenue across different product segments within the same GICS industry to determine 
the extent of related diversification using the same measure. The two measures are defined as 
follows: 
Unrelated Product Diversification (PD) = I [Pi .ln(1/Pi)] 
Related Product Diversification (GD) = j [Pj .ln(1/Pj)] 
Where Pi is the proportion of total sales revenue attributed to unrelated industry sector “i”, Pj 
is the proportion of total sales revenue attributed to related industry segment “j”. ln(1/Pi or j) is 
the weight given to each unrelated industry or related segment. The measure takes a value of 
zero where there is no product diversification and increases with the number of industries / 
segments reported. The higher the value, the greater the extent of product diversification.  
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The diversification data were obtained from the Bloomberg Professional Software. This 
information was reported in accordance with the UK Accounting Standards Board, which 
reflect the requirements of IFRS 8. While this was not introduced until 2009, all of the periods 
concerned are reported on Bloomberg in this way. A criticism of such segment reporting is that 
it may capture both related and unrelated product diversification, because the method of 
calculation is decided by the senior managers of the corporation. Previous work has assumed 
that segment reporting by corporations would reflect only unrelated activities and used this as 
the basis for calculating the extent of product diversification. However, in scrutinising 
corporate finance statements, we determine that many companies report product segments 
which are actually related. As a result, previous studies exaggerate the extent of unrelated 
product diversification conducted by corporations. Consequently, one of our empirical 
contributions to this field of literature is adopting a tighter definition of product diversification. 
We use the Bloomberg Professional software to identify which 2-digit Global Industrial 
Classification Standard (GICS) codes a corporation is included against; both primary activities 
and secondary activities. We cross-reference the reporting segments in a corporation’s financial 
statements with these codes and allocate the different segments to the relevant 2-digit GICS 
code. For instance, a number of the companies only had a single 2-digit GICS code, yet reported 
multiple product segments. In contrast to previous work, our classification proposes that these 
corporations conduct no unrelated product diversification. Indeed, we assert that these firms 
are actually exploiting under-utilised resources across related product segments, which 
resource dependency theory suggests is beneficial to shareholders. We believe that such 
detailed research produces a more accurate reflection of the nature and extent of product 
diversification, revealing more meaningful results in relation to the proposed hypotheses about 
not only unrelated, but also, related diversification.      
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Board data were collected from companies’ annual reports, downloaded from the corporations’ 
websites. Information on board composition, directors’ affiliations and tenure were taken from 
the Report of the Board of Directors and Directors’ biographies from the annual report. Data 
on affiliated companies were sourced from the Bloomberg Professional Software. Financial 
information and the segment reporting used to calculate product diversification were sourced 
from the Bloomberg Profession Software. The macroeconomic data on GDP were sourced from 
the Office of National Statistics (ONS) in the UK.   
The independent variables in each of the three hypotheses, relating to board composition, are 
defined as follows. For hypotheses 1a and 1b, board independence is hypothesised as the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. Many prior studies have measured board 
independence using non-executive directors (see Muth and Donaldson, 1998). More recent 
revisions to corporate governance codes have tightened their definitions of independence. We 
adopt the definition of independence included in the relevant version of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code for each period. All corporations governed by the Code (including all those 
in the sample here) are expected to ‘comply’ with the code by having a majority of independent 
directors on the board or ‘explain’ their reasons for failing to comply. Indeed, some companies, 
while believing some of their directors to be independent, had to acknowledge that they weren’t 
independent under the Code. In such circumstances, we determined that such directors were 
not independent. These statements, included in the corporate governance reports, enabled a 
more accurate measure of board independence than used in previous work.     
For hypothesis 2, we count board members who were current executive directors of companies 
with different 2-digit GICS codes to the one which is the object of study. We only measure 
executive directorships since, such positions in affiliated companies, will be anticipated to 
provide the necessary expertise and credibility to help foster extra-industry investment.  
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To determine the proportion of institutional representatives on the board of directors in order 
to test hypotheses 3a and 3b, we focused on directors who were current executive directors of 
financial institutions, since they would have full information about their company’s activities.   
Even if they have no direct link with a company’s institutional ownership blocks, independent 
directors who are executive directors of financial institutions may have an insiders’ knowledge 
and expertise, reducing monitoring costs and ensuring corporate decisions reflect shareholders’ 
interests. Hence, we include this measure of institutional representation to assess whether this 
insiders’ knowledge has any influence on the extent of diversification – unrelated and related. 
Further, we tightened the definition of this variable to include only directors of financial 
institutions which held shareholdings in the corporation to assess whether it was ownership 
which was the key incentive to monitor properly.  
The models include control variables representing board characteristics, size, leverage, free 
cash flow, liquidity, industry and general macroeconomic conditions. We include the 
proportion of board members representing other non-institutional ownership groups on the 
board (individual, family or state) as a control variable since these can influence board 
dynamics in decision-making (Hautz et al., 2013). Since, company CEOs are in a central 
position to influence board decisions, as their tenure lengthens, they can become more 
entrenched and less likely to pursue shareholders’ interests (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
Therefore, we include CEO tenure as a control variable. Additionally, we include the average 
tenure of a company’s independent directors in each period as a measure of their monitoring 
ability – the longer the average tenure, the more effective their monitoring.  
Since larger companies are more able to diversify (Anderson et al., 2000; Ramaswamy et al., 
2002), company size (TASSETS) is measured as the natural log function of total assets. Higher 
debt levels should be associated with higher levels of investment, funding growth. Therefore, 
leverage (LEV) is measured as the debt to total assets ratio. Liquidity (LIQ), measured as the 
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current ratio (ratio of current assets to current liabilities), is a complementary measure to 
leverage (Gul and Leung, 2004). This is a proxy for the ability of a corporation to support high 
debt levels. It is expected to be positively related to the extent of diversification. Jensen (1986) 
argues that managers have an incentive to use free cash flow to undertake excessive 
diversification through value-destroying acquisitions in order to extend their control over 
resources. We measure free cash flow (FCF) as net cash flow from operations plus interest paid 
plus net cash flows from investing activities. 
Ramaswamy, et al., (2002) argue that industry membership is likely to play a role in 
determining the path of diversification a firm pursues through factors such as product 
differentiation, industry maturity and potential for synergies across supporting industries. 
Industry membership is included as a set of three categorical variables (these are related to the 
corporation’s primary two-digit GICS code), to control for inter-industry differences in 
diversification levels. We also include the annual index level of UK GDP at constant prices 
(Base = 2012) to reflect the macroeconomic environment, since this may influence any changes 
to product diversification in any year. Table I shows a list of variable names and definitions.       
 
INSERT TABLE I HERE 
 
3.3 Empirical Design 
Panel regression models are used to test the above hypotheses. Model 1 which is used to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b, relates the diversification of the corporation to the proportion of 
independent directors on the board, as well as the control variables.  
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DIV = 0 + 1PID + 2POWN + 3CEOT + 4IDT + 5LEV + 6LIQ + 7FCF8IND + 
9OUTPUT + t          (1) 
Hypotheses 2 is tested using model 2, which relates total diversification to proportion of board 
members with extra-industry executive directorships on the board. 
DIV = 0 + 1PER + + 2POWN + 3CEOT + 4IDT + 5ASSETS+ 6LEV + 7 LIQ + 
8FCF9IND + 10OUTPUT + t         (2) 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are tested using model 3, which relates total diversification to proportion 
of institutional representatives on the board. 
DIV = 0 + 1PIR + + 2POWN + 3CEOT + 4IDT + 5ASSETS+ 6LEV + 7 LIQ + 
8FCF9IND + 10OUTPUT + t        (3) 
For the three models, separate regressions were run for the two dimensions of diversification; 
unrelated and related product diversification. 
For each firm, the dimensions of product diversification are measured using the Jacquemin and 
Berry (JB) statistic. In years where there is no product diversification the value of the dependent 
variable is censored at zero. Product diversification by firms, either unrelated or related results 
in a positive JB measure. In our data, there are a large number of observations with a zero 
value. There are 360 observations with a zero value for unrelated product diversification and 
180 observations with a zero value for related product diversification. With this distribution, 
an OLS would yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. In order to ensure that the 
censured observations can be retained for analysis in order to produce valid results, a panel 
Tobit regression is used. This is normally used in situations where there are unobservable 
values of the dependent variable beyond a certain point, but is appropriate where there is a 
limited, but continuous dependent variable (McKnight and Weir, 2009). This is the case for 
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our measures of the dependent variable. In the Tobit model, the observed value for the 
dependent variable (DIV) is distinguished as follows; 0 if DIV= 0 (no diversification) and the 
JB measure if DIV> 0 (positive diversification). Parameters are then estimated by maximising 
the log likelihood function.  
 
4 Empirical Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 50 companies in the sample, 34 (68%) conducted no unrelated product diversification 
at any time over the period. Of the remaining 16, only 11 exhibited unrelated product 
diversification across the entire period. Figure I illustrates the mean JB measure for the sub-
sample of firms who exhibited unrelated product diversification. The mean values across all 
the years are much less than previous studies (see Chen et al., 2009; Hitt et al., 1997). This may 
reflect our more restrictive definition for unrelated product diversification. The graph shows a 
declining trend across the period, arrested to some extent by the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
The pattern is consistent with evidence of an increasing focus in corporate activities since the 
1990s (Haynes et al, 2000).  
A greater proportion of the sample conducted related product diversification (35 companies). 
27 exhibited positive related product diversification across the whole period. Five companies 
moved from positive product diversification to none during the time period. The mean level of 
related diversification across the whole period is also higher compared to unrelated product 
diversification (0.8203 compared to 0.622). Figure II illustrates the mean JB statistic for the 
sub-sample of firms who exhibited related product diversification. There was a slight increase 
in the average across the period for this sub-group.  
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INSERT TABLE II HERE 
 
Descriptive statistics are provided in table II. The average proportion of independent directors 
is 0.5219. There is a slight increase in the average proportion over the period reflecting greater 
compliance by firms to recent revisions of the UK corporate governance code. The average 
proportion of institutional representatives on the board is 0.0537, which is very low. If the 
definition of institutional representation is tightened to include only directors who are 
executives of financial institutions with ownership interests, the mean falls to 0.007. This is 
extremely low and changes very little across the period, suggesting little push to appoint such 
directors. Indeed, 16 (32%) of the firms had no board members with institutional executive 
directorships in any year between 2005 and 2015. The average proportion of directors with 
extra-industry affiliations is 0.1274. This is low and changes little across the period.  
 
INSERT TABLE III HERE 
 
Table III illustrates the correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables. While 
significant collinearity exists between a several variable pairs, it is the one between the natural 
log of total assets (TASSETS) and the proportion of independent directors (PID) which impacts 
on the regression analysis. This supports the argument that larger firms will have more pressure 
to conform to Code requirements regarding the proportion of independent directors and do so. 
Consequently, these variables will be included in different regression models.  
 
4.3 Results from Estimations - Unrelated Product Diversification 
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In order to analyse the impact of changes in board composition on the extent of unrelated 
product diversification over time, we conducted panel Tobit regressions. Table IV shows the 
results of the regression analysis. The effects of decisions to enter or leave product segments 
will take time to enact, so for all the models, a lagged estimation was used. We settled on 2 
year lags since it would take time for board changes to influence decisions and further time for 
the changes to be enacted.  
In relation to model 1, the results indicate a significant relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and the degree of unrelated product diversification in a way 
which supports efficiency theory. The negative sign of the coefficient supports agency theory 
– a higher proportion of independent directors on boards leads to decreases in the extent of 
unrelated product diversification. Therefore, hypothesis 1a cannot be rejected. 
 
INSERT TABLE IV HERE 
 
For model 2, the coefficient on the proportion of board members with extra-industry 
directorships is insignificant. Hence, hypothesis 2 can be rejected – a higher proportion of 
directors with extra-industry links does not promote greater unrelated product diversification. 
This casts doubt on resource dependency theory and its conceptions of the influence of 
directors’ expertise on corporate decisions.   
Model 3 show no significant relationship between the proportion of institutional 
representatives on boards and the extent of unrelated product diversification. This does not 
suggest that board members with such expertise act to overcome information asymmetries 
between executive and independent directors on boards. Tightening the definition of this 
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variable to incorporate only those directors representing institutions with ownership stakes has 
no impact on the results. Therefore, hypothesis 3a can be rejected.    
In all of the models, the average tenure of independent directors had a significant influence on 
the extent of unrelated product diversification. The sign of the coefficient is negative, 
suggesting that as such board members gain more experience of companies as a group they 
may feel more confident to challenge executives’ excessive diversification, forcing a 
retrenchment in the scope of activities. This supports agency theory. In addition, changes in 
the leverage ratio has a significantly positive coefficient in all of the models. Liquidity has a 
significantly negative influence on the extent of unrelated product diversification. This is 
inconsistent with previous work. The results indicate that those firms classified as industrials 
were more likely to have greater unrelated product diversification than those classified as 
consumer orientated. 
4.4 Related Product Diversification 
In order to analyse the impact of changes in board composition on the extent of related product 
diversification over time, we conducted panel Tobit regressions. As with unrelated product 
diversification, a lagged estimation was used since it would be expected that changes in 
independent variables would take time to influence the extent of product diversification. A lag 
of two years was used. Table V shows the results of the regression analysis. 
In relation to model 1, the results indicate a significant relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and the degree of related product diversification. The sign 
is positive indicating that a higher proportion of independent directors produces greater related 
product diversification. Therefore, hypothesis 1b cannot be rejected. This supports agency 
theory propositions regarding the influence of independent directors on strategic decisions. It 
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also supports efficiency theory since the relationship supports the view that more independent 
boards promote value-enhancing related diversification.    
INSERT TABLE V HERE 
For model 3, the results show a significant relationship between the proportion of institutional 
representatives on boards and the extent of related product diversification. However, the sign 
of the coefficient suggests that higher proportions of such board members actually produce 
lower levels of related diversification. This is not consistent with agency theory propositions.  
They may well act to maintain very narrowly focused enterprises. Tightening the definition of 
this variable to include directors representing institutions with ownership stakes has no impact 
on the results. Therefore, hypothesis 3b can be rejected.    
In all of the models, both debt and liquidity are significant influences on related product 
diversification. However, the signs are conflicting. Higher debt is associated with higher related 
diversification. In contrast, lower liquidity is associated with higher related diversification. The 
results indicate that industrial classification has a significant influence on the extent of related 
product diversification. Companies in the consumer sector are more likely to engage in related 
product diversification than industrials. In model 3 only, the coefficient for total assets is 
significantly positive, indicating that larger firms are more likely to engage in related 
diversification. In contrast, the coefficient for CEO tenure is significantly negative. This 
suggests longer-serving CEOs are associated with lower levels of related product 
diversification.  
 
5 Implications of the Results 
The results show some limited support for the influence of board composition on corporate 
governance. Agency theory proposes that more independent boards are more likely to 
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overcome information asymmetries between executive and independent directors, ensuring 
strategic decisions are consistent in promoting shareholders’ interests in ways which supports 
efficiency theory. Firstly, 34 of the 50 companies in our sample conducted no unrelated product 
diversification across the period at all. Of the remaining 16 companies which did, the average 
level decreased across the period. Secondly, our regression results suggest that increases in the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards were associated with decreases in the 
extent of unrelated product diversification. Thirdly, our results also show that increases in the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards were associated with increases in the 
degree of related product diversification. Finally, our research disputes resource dependency 
theory since the proportion of board members with extra-industry executive directorships had 
no influence on changes in the extent of unrelated diversification.     
Overall, the work suggests that the emphasis on board independence in corporate governance 
reform by the UK regulatory authorities may be appropriate. However, the observed 
association needs to be treated with caution. As listing requirements regarding board 
independence for UK corporations have tightened over the last decade, it would be expected 
that the proportion of such directors on UK boards would rise. This was indeed the case for our 
sample. Across all the companies in our sample, whether they conducted product 
diversification (unrelated and related) or not, there was an increasing proportion of independent 
directors on boards.  
Our results indicate that directors with links to financial institutions do not influence the extent 
of unrelated product diversification, but do affect the extent of related product diversification 
– though not in the way proposed by agency theory. They do not help overcome information 
asymmetry in boards. Therefore, proposals to encourage the active involvement of such 
institution to ensure that resources are invested in a productive manner must be treated with 
caution. However, given the very low incidence of this type of director among the companies 
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in our sample, it may be premature to draw firm conclusions. More work needs to be done 
analysing their impact on a variety of corporate decisions.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper adds to the literature surrounding the governance role of corporate boards of 
directors by exploring the link between board composition and corporate diversification. The 
paper makes a contribution to research in this area by testing several hypotheses based on 
innovations surrounding board dynamics involving information asymmetry. Given the 
emphasis on agency theory in regulatory reforms, the hypotheses propose relationships 
between different aspects of board composition which reflect its conceptions. Further, we 
develop a hypothesis testing resource dependency theory. Previous work focused on cross-
sectional analysis. We advance research by adopting a panel data analysis, tracing changes in 
board composition and corporate diversification over 11 years between 2005 and 2015 in a 
sample of large UK listed companies. This enabled the work to analyse differences across 
companies, but also analyse the dynamic relationships within companies over time. The results 
of this longitudinal study complement existing work by analysing how board changes over a 
number of years may influence strategic decisions. We also make a novel contribution by 
distinguishing between unrelated and related diversification and analysing the contrasting 
propositions about the influence of board composition on each. Consequently, we extend 
knowledge of the nature and extent of board involvement in ensuring resources are used 
effectively but, also provide evidence which can help guide corporate governance research and 
policy in the UK and similar jurisdictions.  
The results are subject to limitations. The operationalisation of board independence is one 
limitation. The definition of an independent director changes with revisions to the UK 
corporate governance, and many companies stated in their reports that, even though certain 
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directors do not qualify as independent under the Code, they were considered independent. 
Therefore, using the proportion of Code qualified independent directors on a board may not 
capture the full complexity of the concept.  Further, despite the use of a panel of 50 large UK 
companies over 11 years, a large proportion exhibited no unrelated product diversification at 
all across the period, which means there are limits to the generalisability of the results. A 
broader study of UK firms may be beneficial. However, given the increasing trend for more 
narrowly-focused enterprises in developed corporate environments, analysing product 
diversification may not be a fruitful way of analysing the role of boards in strategy. The 
investigation of different types of strategic decisions may increasingly provide the variation in 
outcomes which yield useful results.  
The definitions which have been used to determine board composition in this study are 
approximate measures of decision-making dynamics within boards of directors. To count as 
having institutional or extra-industry links, board members needed to be executive directors. 
Such a strict definition severely limited the incidence of such board members in our sample. It 
may be that looser definitions of directors’ affiliations may capture the influences of these 
characteristics on strategy and provide a more meaningful measure for analysis. Further, 
emerging qualitative research investigating board dynamics may be more beneficial, 
particularly in relation to the influence of institutional representatives (Huse et al., 2011).  
The results show that increased board independence advances the interests of shareholders by 
restraining unrelated corporate diversification and promoting related corporate diversification. 
This is consistent with the prevailing agency perspective that boards perform a monitoring role. 
Additionally, our results show that the average tenure of these independent directors has an 
important role to play. Longer average tenures promote changes in product diversification in 
line with shareholders’ interests. This suggests that the regulatory drive for more board 
independence in the UK, and more widely, may resolve principal-agent conflicts in companies. 
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However, one must be careful in drawing conclusions about the influence of independent 
directors on decision-making. The UK regulatory authorities must not rely on a single 
operationalisation of board independence. Board interactions are complicated. Our results 
suggest that in addition to appointing more independent directors to corporate boards, they 
must be appointed for periods of time which are sufficient to learn enough about the companies 
in order to overcome the asymmetric information they face, producing more effective 
monitoring and corporate governance. 
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Table I: Variable Names, Definitions and their Source 
Variable 
Name 
Definition  Source 
DIV Measure of Diversification: Unrelated product 
diversification (UPD) or related product 
diversification (RPD) 
Author’s calculations using 
data from Bloomberg  
PID The proportion of independent directors on 
the board  
Company Report of the 
Directors 
PIR The proportion of institutional representatives 
on the board: either executives of institutions 
with ownership interests in the company or 
executives of institutions (PIROWN), 
irrespective of ownership (PIR).   
Company Report of the 
Directors 
PED The proportion of board members with extra-
industry (different 2-digit GICS) executive 
directorships).  
Company Report of the 
Directors 
PNIOWN The proportion of board members 
representing non-institutional ownership 
interests  
Company Report of the 
Directors 
CEOT CEO tenure measured in years.  Company Report of the 
Directors 
IDT Average tenure of independent directors 
measured in years 
Company Report of the 
Directors 
TASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets of the 
company  
Bloomberg Professional 
Service 
LEV Leverage Ratio: Ratio of Long-term debt to 
total assets of the company 
Bloomberg Professional 
Service 
LIQ Current ratio: ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities 
Bloomberg Professional 
Service 
FCF Free Cash Flow: net cash flow from 
operations plus interest paid plus net cash 
flows from investing activities 
Bloomberg Professional 
Service 
IND Categorical measure covering three industrial 
sectors adapted using the primary 2-digit 
GICS Code 
Bloomberg Professional 
Service 
GDP Index of UK Gross Domestic Product at 
constant prices (2012 – 100) 
Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) 
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Figure I: Mean Jacquemin and Berry (JB) Statistic for Firms exhibiting Unrelated 
Product Diversification between 2005 and 2015 
 
 
 
 
Figure II: Mean Jacquemin and Berry (JB) Statistic for Firms exhibiting Related Product 
Diversification between 2005 and 2015 
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median Max Min. Std. Dev. Observations 
UPD 0.622 0.609 1.679 0 0.462 176 
RPD 0.820 0.707 1.900 0 0.454 385 
PID 0.522 0.500 0.846 0 0.125 550 
PED 0.127 0.111 0.571 0 0.122 550 
PIR 0.054 0.000 0.429 0 0.078 550 
PIROWN 0.007 0.000 0.167 0 0.027 550 
PNIOWN 0.021 0.000 0.250 0 0.053 550 
CEOT 5.1 4.0 33 0 4.99 550 
IDT 3.876 3.750 23.000 0 2.026 550 
ASSETS 7.865 7.920 11.097 2.915 1.320 550 
LEV 0.210 0.210 0.831 0 0.145 550 
LIQ 1.269 1.236 4.377 0.2264 0.568 550 
FCF 269.364 98.75 5750.00 -3361 780.135 550 
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Table III Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
Variables UPD RPD PID PIR PED PNIOWN CEOT IDT SIZE LEV LIQ FCF OUTPUT 
UPD 1              
RPD -0.308** 1            
PID -0.160 0.098 1           
PIR -0.101 -0.216 0.007 1          
PED -0.012 0.207 0.091 -0.146 1         
PNIOWN 0.068 -0.030 -0.417** -0.031 -0.077 1        
CEOT 0.169 -0.040 -0.331** 0.017 -0.017 0.349** 1       
IDT -0.154 0.026 -0.030 -0.020 -0.077 0.072 0.003 1      
SIZE 0.032 0.131 0.514** 0.039 0.087 -0.232 -0.158 0.096 1     
LEV -0.012 0.062 0.020 -0.134 0.082 -0.092 -0.125 0.050 0.077 1    
LIQ -0.009 0.014 0.008 0.055 0.028 -0.012 -0.009 -0.024 0.007 -0.024 1   
FCF -0.001 -0.005 0.248 0.150 0.096 -0.125 -0.034 -0.007 0.364** 0.056 -0.007 1  
GDP 0.054 -0.019 -0.246 -0.033 -0.107 0.030 -0.105 -0.019 -0.170 -0.050 -0.074 -0.019 1 
 
*indicates significance at 0.05 level 
** indicates significance at 0.01 level 
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Table IV: Panel Tobit Regression Results for Unrelated Product Diversification  
 Model 1 
Panel Tobit 
Regression 
Model 2 
Panel Tobit 
Regression 
Model 3 
Panel Tobit 
Regression 
Intercept 1.721 (1.452) -0.126 (-0.107) -0.088 (-0.076) 
PID (-2) -1.071 (-2.165)*   
PER (-2)  0.003 (0.007)  
PIR (-2)   -0.803 (-1.178) 
Control Variables 
PNIOWN (-2) 
 
CEOT (-2) 
 
IDT (-2) 
 
LASSETS (-2) 
 
LEV (-2) 
 
LIQ (-2) 
 
FCF (-2) 
 
GDP (-2) 
 
Industry 
 
-2.251 (-1.970)* 
 
0.012 (1.039) 
 
-0.207 (-5.436)** 
 
 
 
1.524 (3.721)** 
 
-0.265 (-3.005)** 
 
3.16e-05 (0.436) 
 
-2.82e-03 (-0.292) 
 
n.a 
 
 
-1.017 (-0.941) 
 
0.02 (1.93)* 
 
-0.207 (-5.363)** 
 
0.058 (1.337) 
 
1.658 (4.065)** 
 
-0.266 (-2.866)** 
 
-4.48e-05 (-0.621) 
 
0.005 (0.473) 
 
n.a. 
 
-0.984 (-0.93) 
 
0.021 (2.008)* 
 
-0.205 (-5.362)** 
 
0.061 (1.422) 
 
1.598 (3.916)** 
 
-0.241 (-2.69)** 
 
-3.43e-05(-0.477) 
 
0.004 (0.421) 
 
n.a. 
Observations 450 450 450 
Companies 50 50 50 
Wald  61.933 55.510 56.638 
Log -Likelihood -260.943 -262448 -261.742 
Coefficients of dependent variables shown (z-statistics are in parenthesis) 
*indicates significance at 0.05 level 
** indicates significance at 0.01 level 
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Table V: Panel Tobit Regression Results for Related Product Diversification  
 Model 1 
Panel Tobit 
Regression  
Model 3 
Panel Tobit 
Regression 
Intercept -0.803 (-0.886) -0.211 (-0.241) 
PID (-2) 1.17 (3.082)*  
PER (-2)   
PIR (-2)  -2.246 (-4.437)** 
Control Variables 
PNIOWNR (-2) 
 
CEOT (-2) 
 
IDT (-2) 
 
LASSETS (-2) 
 
LEV (-2) 
 
LIQ (-2) 
 
FCF (-2) 
 
GDP (-2) 
 
Industry 
 
0.271 (0.331) 
 
-0.015 (-1.574) 
 
0.003 (1.443) 
 
 
 
0.771 (2.664)** 
 
-0.209 (-2.837)* 
 
-2.89e-05 (-0.628) 
 
7.5e-03 (1.011) 
 
n.a. 
 
 
-0.294 (-0.379) 
 
-0.022 (-2.424)* 
 
0.026 (1.203)* 
 
0.08 (2.465) 
 
0.505 (1.793) 
 
-0.163 (-2.246)** 
 
-6.28e-07 (-0.013) 
 
0.003 (0.463) 
 
n.a. 
 
Observations 450 450 
Companies 50 50 
Wald  30.297 44.447 
Log -Likelihood -466.806 -458.058 
Coefficients of dependent variables shown (z-statistics are in parenthesis) 
*indicates significance at 0.05 level 
** indicates significance at 0.01 level 
 
 
